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Introduction 
Risk is increasingly central to a variety of academic disciplines and spheres of public and political 
life – it is arguably the main lens through which scientists, policy-makers, and publics characterise and 
debate environmental and public health problems ranging from climate change to food security to 
biodiversity loss. The field of risk research has long been concerned with how experts and laypeople 
evaluate environmental dangers and potential responses; the role of value judgments, interests, and 
moral commitments in this; and how lay knowledge, expertise, stakeholder interests and ethical 
arguments should be drawn upon to make decisions within particular institutional arrangements. 
However, the literature is widely dispersed, and marked by a healthy pluralism regarding foundational 
assumptions and analytical frameworks. As such, there is a pressing need to synthesize this fragmented 
knowledge, reflect on the major theoretical debates, and speculate on future research trajectories. This 
section is an attempt to do so. The contributed chapters are all broadly talking about the same thing - 
public understanding and the governance of environmental risks - although they are rooted in quite 
different philosophical and methodological heritages. Arvai et al.’s paper is very much in the tradition of 
the formal decision sciences; Macnaghten’s work is rooted in European thinking within Science and 
Technology Studies; whilst Renn attempts to integrate a variety of disciplinary perspectives on risk, 
albeit with an emphasis on macro-level social theory. As such, distinctions and commonalities abound, 
roughly in equal measure. Rather than review the individual contributions - the chapters speak for 
themselves - this paper focuses on some of those common themes and disjunctures. In doing so we 
forward various claims of our own, which are primarily intended to be provocative rather than 
definitive.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We first provide a schematic outline of the 
evolution of Beck and Giddens’ “risk society,” before connecting this relatively abstract account with 
more empirically grounded analyses of lay discourses about risk, technology and innovation. Drawing in 
particular on Macnaghten’s field work, we reflect on whether the notion of moral autonomy has 
anything to add to social theories of risk, particularly in relation to public alienation and 
(dis)engagement, and with regard to the apparent reemergence of fate as an organising concept in 
public discourse about risk issues. We then turn to consider whether a “risk framing” can act to close-
 down the characterisation of environmental problems in ways that are both reductive and exclusionary 
to public engagement, drawing on Andy Stirling and Brian Wynne’s ideas. Such an argument is explicit in 
Macnaghten’s contribution, perhaps implicit in Renn’s chapter and his previous work, while Arvai et al. 
seemingly either reject it or are agnostic. We then explore questions surrounding the realism and 
generalisability of those laboratory experiments which make up such a large portion of the decision 
sciences, reviewed by Arvai et al. We draw a contrast between the theoretical commitments of decision 
scientists and those evolutionary psychologists who focus on risk and uncertainty - most notable among 
them Gerd Gigerenzer - and discuss how this shapes their contrasting approaches to experimental 
design and how they interpret empirical data. We note that transportability or external validity is not a 
problem restricted to laboratory findings, and that claims about the broader relevance of empirical 
findings turn on the specifics of the research design (rather than whether it was conducted in the field 
or the laboratory), and on the cogency of the theoretical arguments used to justify any generalisation. 
Context - that slippery, ill-defined, yet crucial concept - is central to understanding the psychology of 
risk, and can in principle be explored and manipulated in the laboratory as well as in the field. We 
suggest that the study of decision making under uncertainty has become rather disconnected from the 
rest of cognitive psychology. In particular, the notion that conscious thought may play a substantive role 
in shaping how people reason about risk appears to have dropped out of the thinking of the decision 
sciences. We turn to critique the commonly rehearsed argument that decision-theoretic approaches to 
inference and choice are only applicable to a relatively restricted subset of decision contexts (the “small 
worlds” argument). Idealising assumptions can transform large worlds into small worlds, allowing the 
deployment of the full Bayesian apparatus. We then reflect on the paradox that a (skewed) 
interpretation of the findings of the decision sciences has travelled so easily into some institutional risk 
management and governance practices (the “cognitive miser”), despite long standing concerns about its 
external validity. The deficit model is dead; long live the deficit model! Variations on the “frame 
problem” structure our discussion throughout the paper. A brief conclusion follows.    
 
The risk society and public (dis)engagement: alienation, or the abdication of moral autonomy? 
Renn and Macnaghten’s chapters draw heavily upon the idea of the broken promises of the 
Enlightenment’s modernist narrative. This storyline positioned humans as no longer being at the mercy 
of fate, but rather as purposefully navigating their way through possible futures, harnessing the 
relentless growth of science and technology to tame and exploit nature in pursuit of social and 
economic progress (Leiss, 1974; Giddens, 1990). This had begun to look like a rather utopian idea by the 
 mid-20th century, which marked the growing recognition of the variety of ways that humans – via 
technology – were degrading the natural environment (Beck, 1992). Whilst in the past, people worried 
primarily about the risks of nature – from bad harvests, floods, plagues or famines - by this point they 
had begun to worry more about the risks that they posed to nature (Giddens, 2011). This widespread 
concern led to the repair program of the “regulatory state,” characterised by risk management 
institutions that focussed on individual risk objects or technologies within specific jurisdictions, whilst 
paying limited attention to tradeoffs or interactions across domains, places, or scales (Sunstein, 1990; 
Wiener and Graham, 2009). However, the tenability of the repair program was challenged by the 
emergence of a new category of (global) risks. Their causes and consequences were not limited to a 
particular location or place; they were of our own making, yet also paradoxically it was unclear whose 
responsibility they were; and they were deeply challenging to calculate, given their unprecedented 
nature and lack of time series data (Beck, 1992). These new kinds of threats, combined with a series of 
high-profile failures of risk regulation across Europe and the US in the late 20th Century - from 
thalidomide to Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) - lead to a very public questioning of the 
Enlightenment view that technological development was synonymous with social, economic, and human 
progress, and skepticism about the capacity of the regulatory state to handle the tasks that it was 
designed for. The hubristic vision of the mastery of nature, of mankind as the author of his own destiny, 
began to rupture in the face of a sense of submission to a set of global economic, technological and 
cultural forces that are beyond full comprehension, and that seemed to almost possess an agency of 
their own. Rather than becoming more knowable and manageable, the near future was beginning to 
look more stochastic and nonlinear, generating a deep uncertainty that eroded any basis for rational 
planning and action (Reith, 2004). Or at least, this is the schematic account most closely associated with 
Beck and Giddens, which in common with much of continental social theory has been almost entirely 
untethered to empirical inquiry. 
What is particularly interesting about Macnaghten’s contribution is that it reviews empirical 
work that shows some of these abstract themes to be prevalent in the everyday discourse of laypeople, 
albeit in more nuanced and perhaps less dystopian forms. His public engagement research does not 
reveal negative attitudes towards science or innovation per se, but rather skepticism of the capacity of 
innovation under real-world conditions, and current institutions of governance, to overcome both 
foreseen and unforeseen harms, alongside a pervasive sense of fatalism and impotence. For example, 
one widespread public narrative frames emerging technologies such as agricultural biotechnology and 
nanotechnology as having their own internal dynamics and logics that influence society in ways that are 
 largely beyond cultural or even political influence. This is connected with a sense of public alienation, in 
the sense of a feeling of exclusion from the governance of processes of research and technological 
development. Together, this leaves the public dependent on the “expert systems” responsible for the 
development and governance of “techno-visionary” science and innovation (governments, regulators, 
scientists, corporate research and development and media), alongside a feeling that they are deeply 
powerless over their conduct, together with a suspicion that those institutions may not be up to the 
task.  
However, this appears to be a feature not just of public understanding and engagement with 
“techno-visionary” science and innovation. For example, whether in focus groups, surveys, or 
interviews, laypeople frequently invoke industry, economic systems, or political institutions as the 
drivers of climate change, and, by large margins, place responsibility for tackling it firmly at the feet of 
government or politicians (e.g. Hinchliffe, 1996; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001; Spence et al., 2010; 
Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Wolf and Moser, 2011). And a close look at how people make sense of and talk 
about climate change reveals very little ascription of responsibility, or even references to, their own 
choices, behaviours, and actions, except to point out the futility or impossibility of changing them (e.g. 
McDaniels et al., 1996; Phillips, 2000; Bickerstaff et al., 2008).  This suggests that people feel entrapped 
or locked-in to a broader set of social and economic structures. In short, they talk as though they have 
abdicated their moral and practical autonomy to external systems and institutions, leaving them little 
reason or incentive to adopt sustainable behaviours, and perhaps even little justification to believe that 
they ever can. Giddens (1990) has implied that this reflects a kind of psychological prop or coping 
mechanism to counter the anxieties of modernity, aimed at relieving the individual of the burden of 
engaging with existential threats that may otherwise prove chronically disturbing or destabilizing (c.f. 
Macnaghten, 2003). However, this abdication of autonomy is a particular problem given that many 
modern technological hazards or risk sources (e.g. carbon emissions) are so intertwined within the fabric 
of day-to-day social, industrial, and economic life, that the distinction between risk producers and risk 
bearers is rarely clear-cut. 
Macnaghten asks in his contribution why such narratives have emerged at this particular 
juncture in history, and suggests that it stems in part from the exclusion of the public from formal 
processes of technological appraisal and risk governance. That is, he sees it as a counter-narrative or 
response to the institutional logics that emphasise the inevitability of technological progress and of the 
associated gains. Arvai et al. and the decision science tradition more broadly tend to conceive of public 
(dis)engagement with environmental problems in terms of psychological distance and framing effects. 
 On the surface this is quite different from the social theory and Science and Technology Studies 
perspectives, however slightly less formal notions of framing have been used to similar effect within 
these traditions. For example, Hulme (2010) argued that by constructing climate change as a global, 
techno-scientific problem driven by abstract systems (consumption, capitalism, demographics, etc.), 
elites, the media, and governance institutions have made it easy for laypeople to voice superficial 
concerns about the issue, resting alongside relatively little enthusiasm for concrete action or change. In 
other words, this construction has shifted perceptions of agency and autonomy for tackling climate 
change away from local places and people, locating them instead within abstract systems and formal 
institutions (MacGillivray, 2015). On this analysis, the value-action gap on climate change and related 
global sustainability crises - and the widespread public sense of apathy and resignation - is in part a 
framing problem. 
Following this line of argument, the core concern becomes how to introduce a sense of 
meaningful agency and public engagement within processes of innovation and risk governance, a task 
that each contributing author addresses in slightly different ways. Macnaghten advocates upstream 
engagement as a core component of responsible innovation, and in particular the value of focus groups 
and other deliberative forums in getting a better sense of the social and ethical implications of 
technologies at a point early enough to shape or restrict their development. One of us has recently 
reflected on the philosophical and methodological challenges associated with this (Pidgeon et al., 
forthcoming). Renn’s chapter, on the other hand, is favourable to Habermas’ concepts of communicative 
action and communicative competence as a way of enhancing the legitimacy of risk management 
institutions, and makes a strong case for the International Risk Governance Council’s framework, which 
he has been heavily involved in developing. However, he is pessimistic about the capacity of the public 
to engage in technical deliberation on risk issues, on the grounds that they lack the infrastructure of 
modern scientific institutions. This idea - that in a society with a sharp division of knowledge most truth-
claims will remain opaque, meaning that the public must rely on judgements about the trustworthiness 
of experts and institutions  rather than verify claims for themselves - appears to be as old as the ancient 
Greeks, seemingly inspiring Aristotle’s work on rhetoric (O’neill, 2002). However, whilst it is true that the 
person on the street may lack the capacity to implement laboratory or field experiments on the benefits 
and harms of GM crops or nanotechnology, this does not prevent them from scrutinising the design and 
governance of such experiments, the assumptions that underlie them, and the chains of inference in 
moving from field or laboratory observations to determinations of risk and benefit (e.g. see Pidgeon et 
al., 2013). Arvai et al. are concerned more with decision support, that is, with structuring and framing 
 decision-making environments such that individuals and groups can make choices that are consistent 
with their values. An interesting distinction between the three chapters is that whilst Renn and Arvai et 
al.’s analyses are thoroughly rooted within the field of risk research, Macnaghten expresses a concern 
that framing processes of innovation and technological development as “risk” problems is unnecessarily 
reductive. We turn to this below. 
 
Is a risk framing synonymous with “closing-down” the governance of environmental problems and 
processes of technological innovation? 
 One of us recently forwarded the argument that risk-based approaches are one of a small set of 
archetypes for governing environmental and public health problems, together with precautionary, 
adaptive, and deliberative regime types (MacGillivray and Richards, 2015). These types each hold 
distinct norms about what constitutes valid evidence, how evidence should be used, and what 
constitutes the proper ethical framework for decision-making (e.g. means-ends vs. communicative 
rationality). This built on previous work of Renn and colleagues, who developed various typologies of the 
“risk issues” faced by contemporary societies, setting out how each category of problems lends itself to 
particular analytical methods (e.g. Klinke and Renn, 2002 and Pellizzoni, 2001). For example, routine, 
well characterised problems are thought to lend themselves to the methods of probabilistic risk analysis, 
whereas contested, ambiguous issues require more participatory methods such as scenario planning to 
explore them. We extended this idea by claiming that problem characteristics and types of governance 
are co-produced (c.f. Jasanoff, 2004). What we argued is that the risk-based type, for example, does not 
simply lend itself to problems that are well-structured, largely technical, and mathematically tractable. 
Instead, it also constructs problems as holding the aforementioned characteristics, through the 
particular ontologies, frames, methods, and types of evidence that it draws upon or applies (Shackley et 
al., 1996 and Clifford and Richards, 2005).  
Scholars from within the STS tradition - in particular Wynne (1992), Jasanoff (1993), Stirling 
(2008), and Macnaghten (this section) - have long voiced similar concerns, namely that the institutional 
dominance of the risk-based logic privileges particular kinds of analytical frameworks, evidence, societal 
goals, and approaches to public (non)participation that are reductive and technocratic. In his chapter, 
Macnaghten argues that “public engagement research with risk is rarely simply about risk as defined by 
institutional science. It is also about innovation, about the kinds of society we value and wish science 
and innovation processes to collectively contribute towards; it is also about control, about who will take 
responsibility if things go wrong.” This leads to a normative agenda that conceives of governing techno-
 visionary science and innovation not as a risk issue, but as a public issue with a technical dimension, and 
by extension prescribes extensive upstream engagement, deliberation on deep values, and discussion of 
the kinds of futures and societies that we want to produce. Yet in practice what we often see is a 
perpetual tendency on the part of regulatory institutions to restructure ill-defined, contested problems 
of innovation and technological development - deeply implicated in issues of what kind of futures, 
fundamental values, and identities we want to create - into neatly defined and compartmentalised 
technical problems of risk (Wynne, 2006; Stirling, 2008; MacGillivray and Franklin, 2015). Institutional 
practices of public engagement often remain rather superficial, for example taking place following the 
technical analysis (leaving little space for public scrutiny or participation), and reflecting attempts to 
manage or dampen controversy rather than secure meaningful public input (Wynne, 2006; Stirling, 
2008; Lane et al., 2011). Macnaghten is also critical of some public engagement research for uncritically 
adopting dominant policy frames and institutional concerns, in ways that close-down the opportunity 
for eliciting deep values, conversations about the social meaning of technologies, and discussions of the 
desired trajectories of innovation rather than the details of particular risk objects (see also Pidgeon et 
al., forthcoming; Bellamy and Lezaun, 2015). 
Renn’s current chapter adopts a slightly different stance, seemingly viewing risk as an organising 
concept that is open to a plural mix of analytical techniques, modes of participation, and governance. 
Perhaps the distinction stems from Macnaghten’s focus on institutional logics of risk as they exist in the 
world, whereas Renn orientation is more theoretical. Moreover, whether this is a substantive distinction 
or a semantic one is unclear. For example, consistent with his earlier work, Renn’s chapter emphasises 
that the proper approach to risk governance - in terms of the analytical tools, decision making goals, and 
modes of participation - is a function of whether a problem should be characterised as simple, complex, 
uncertain, or ambiguous. This seems coherent with Macnaghten’s stance. However, if all forms of 
analysis, deliberation, decision-making and governance can be bracketed under the risk concept, does 
the latter begin to lose its theoretical purchase? For example, integrative approaches such as the social 
amplification of risk framework (SARF) - which Renn co-developed and discusses at length - have been 
critiqued for reflecting a category error of sorts, that of attempting to synthesize concepts and 
theoretical frameworks that are ontologically in conflict (Duckett and Busby, 2013). However, this 
critique perhaps stems from a (mis)perception that SARF seeks to offer a coherent theory of the 
evolution of risk crises, as opposed to a heuristic framework for organising empirical inquiries across 
plural disciplinary perspectives (Kasperson et al., 2003).  
 Arvai et al., on the other hand, are sensitive to the limits of decision-theoretic approaches as 
applied to real-world problems, but do not focus much on governance per se. However, they are very 
concerned with framing and the related issue of the construction of preferences, which has some 
structural parallels with the concept of closing-down. They write at length on how differences in the 
ways that structurally identical problems are framed or presented can influence people’s judgments and 
preferences. However, whilst Macnaghten and his fellow travellers take these ideas to imply the 
importance of using open-frames in eliciting public views, values, and deliberations on emerging 
technologies, Arvai et al. are primarily interested in how the decision making environment of everyday 
life can be reframed to help people make decisions that are consistent with their values. More on this 
below.  
 
Risk perception research: realism, the rationality wars, and the recalcitrance of the deficit model 
 Arvai et. al. and Macnaghten’s chapters draw heavily on the findings of empirical research, 
although the underlying methodologies and epistemologies are quite different. Amongst the core design 
features of Macnaghten’s research program are an orientation towards context and situated reasoning, 
drawing on a range of methods from group deliberations, to simulated risk controversies, to role playing 
and theatrical performances. This methodological commitment to context however is not equivalent to 
particularism or a retreat from theory. Bearing this out, his analytical approach focuses on key rhetorical 
arguments organised within themes, how these interplay with broader social discourses and narratives, 
and on how they relate to theoretical and policy concerns. In contrast, the decision sciences tradition, 
which Arvai et al. review, is not concerned with argumentation or discourse per se, but rather with the 
fundamental cognitive processes that govern (individual) judgments about risk, probability, and the 
construction of preferences. This emphasis on the underlying mechanics of reasoning - rather than on 
how they interplay with context and contingency to give rise to narratives and metaphors - leads 
naturally to research designs which are relatively abstract and idealised. The logic here is to strip away 
contextual influences, environmental variation, and irrelevant features of decision problems so as to 
better isolate the underlying cognitive processes. Credibility within this tradition depends on 
replicability - research designs are simplified and standardised so as to best ensure that the results 
unfold in the same fashion regardless of who conducts them, or where they are implemented.  
Of course, replicability is not the same thing as generalisability, and a finding that replicates in 
standardised laboratory conditions may not necessarily transport to real-world settings. This is 
particularly true for the social rather than physical sciences, where the operation of underlying 
 mechanisms (e.g. cognitive and motivational processes) may be context, language and culture 
dependent, rather than uniform and invariant. Indeed a long-standing critique of the decision sciences 
has focussed on the perceived limited realism of their experimental settings. Commonly rehearsed 
arguments include that the experiments lack sufficient incentives for good performance; offer little to 
no opportunity for learning from peers or mentors; rely on toy problems that abstract away from 
everyday expertise and contextual cues (“urns and balls”); and sample from a population that may be 
somewhat psychologically unusual (people from Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic 
societies) (Levitt and List, 2007; Henrich et al., 2010; Jaeger et al., 2013; MacGillivray and Pidgeon, 2011; 
Green et al., 2016; MacGillivray, 2014a) . We have little to add to these critiques, save to say that in 
principle there is nothing intrinsically artificial about laboratory settings (Falk and Heckman, 2009). The 
question of sufficient realism turns on the details of the individual study design and on the  cogency of 
the theoretical arguments used to justify any extrapolations drawn from it, not on the category of place 
it was conducted in (laboratory vs. field vs. model). Moreover, as research programs mature they 
typically progressively introduce features of context or realism into their designs, meaning that some of 
the above critiques carry less force today. Indeed somewhat ironically, many of the objections raised 
about the realism of experimental settings in the decision sciences - such as the importance of frames, 
social learning, and incentives - rely on evidence that has been generated from within those very 
experimental settings (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Camerer, 2011). However, whilst it is true that the 
behavioural economics and heuristics and biases traditions have been increasingly sensitive to those 
dimensions in their experimental designs, they still tend to favour the use of relatively idealised decision 
problems that abstract away from contextual cues (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; Green et al., 2016; 
Levitt and List, 2007). Interestingly, these fields are particularly influential in public policy and public 
discourse at the moment, a point to which we return later.  
A separate line of critique that bears on the transportability of decision science research focuses 
not on the realism of the laboratory experiments, but rather on the validity of the model of cognitive 
processes that guides their design and interpretation. In brief, decision scientists typically a) assume that 
cognitive processes are domain-general, rather than domain-specific; b) adopt a dual-process model of 
judgment and reasoning, that distinguishes between unconscious, effortless, heuristic processes 
(intuitive), and rule-based, conscious, effortful and analytic processes (deliberative); and c) frame risk 
issues as tasks of estimation and choice (e.g. Kahneman, 2011; Slovic et al., 2004). These basic 
assumptions are in conflict with evolutionary psychologists, who generally reject dual process theories 
in favour of the concept of a modular mind, and conceive of cognitive processes as being a series of 
 domain-specific adaptations tailored to recurrent and persistent problems posed by social and 
ecological environments (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). As Herbert 
Simon (1990) put it, “each kind of task to which the human mind addresses itself may be regarded as 
defining a different species of thought.” In this paradigm, eliciting and evaluating processes of judgment 
and choice under uncertainty requires explicit attention towards domains of reasoning (e.g. making a 
medical diagnosis vs. playing roulette), contextual cues, and structures of information in the 
environment. Rationality from this perspective is about the adaptation of cognition to its environment, 
rather than to the norms of logic or probability theory (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). And so what 
decision scientists view as experimental designs that filter out noise and idealise away from context and 
problem content, evolutionary psychologists see as designs that exclude fundamental features of 
decision-making environments which shape the selection and operation of specific processes of 
inference and choice. For example, Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) showed that introducing task frames 
which encouraged people to view the famous “selection task” as a form of social-contract (i.e. a 
problem of co-operation or reciprocal altruism) initiated a cheater-detection algorithm which lead to 
vastly superior performance. More recently, Green et al. (2016) showed that the use of idealised 
decision problems - those that abstract away contextual cues - makes it difficult for experimental 
subjects to apply their everyday expertise, at least in conditions where expertise takes the form of 
domain or task-specific heuristics. How does this relate to transportability? Researchers within the 
evolutionary psychology tradition - most famously Gigerenzer and colleagues - have argued that the 
methodological commitments of the decision sciences have led to a skeptical view of lay cognitive 
capacities that bears little relation to how people make judgments about risk and probability outside of 
the laboratory (i.e. that the findings are epiphenomena restricted to artificial environments and toy 
problems designed - inadvertently or otherwise - to induce error; e.g. Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; 
Gigerenzer, 1996; Mousavi et al., 2016). Relatedly, the decision sciences framing of risk problems as 
tasks of estimation and choice, together with their relatively shallow process analysis and commitment 
to dual-process theories, has led them to largely neglect informal logic, metaphorical reasoning, causal 
reasoning, moral evaluation, analogical reasoning, deliberative heuristics, and narrative reasoning about 
risk. When decision scientists have considered these forms of reasoning, they have typically done so 
within the framework of estimation and choice, e.g. in exploring how affect (an intuitively driven 
emotional valence) shapes perceived level of risk (e.g. Finucane et al., 2000), or conceiving of moral 
evaluations as post-hoc rationalisations for judgments arrived at by subconscious mechanisms (e.g. 
Haidt, 2001). They have not, in general, viewed them as autonomous processes that shape judgments, 
 values, beliefs, and preferences in relation to risk issues. In short, the idea that conscious thought may 
play a substantive role in shaping how people reason about risk appears to have dropped out of the 
thinking of the decision sciences (c.f. Fodor, 2006). 
Of course, the rationality debates are almost as old as psychology itself, and there is probably 
little more to say of this particular version of it that has not already been committed to print. However, 
we would like to comment in passing on what appears to be a misconception common to many decision 
scientists and evolutionary psychologists. This is the belief that formal decision-theoretic methods - in 
other words, probability theory and utility maximisation - are applicable to a relatively limited subset of 
problem types. This is most explicit in the work of Gigerenzer and colleagues, who trace the notion back 
to Savage’s (1972) distinction between small and large worlds. The argument is that decision theoretic 
approaches are applicable only to decision problems where states of the world, available choices, and 
their associated consequences and probabilities are known to the decision maker (“small worlds”). In 
“large worlds,” characterised by uncertainty relating to these problem dimensions, Gigerenzer claims 
that Savage viewed the application of the full Bayesian apparatus as “utterly ridiculous.” 
 
“Savage carefully limited Bayesian decision theory to “small worlds” in which all alternatives, 
consequences, and probabilities are known. And he warned that it would be “utterly ridiculous” to apply 
Bayesian theory outside a well-defined world—for him, “to plan a picnic” was already outside because 
the planners cannot know all consequences in advance. (Gigerenzer and Marewski, 2015) 
 
 This, however, is based on a misreading of Savage’s point. Savage in fact argued that in order to 
apply Bayesian methods to large worlds, we need to make various simplifying assumptions so that they 
can be analysed as if they were small worlds. This involves, for example, describing states of the world 
and consequences stemming from potential actions at some fixed and by necessity idealised level of 
detail (c.f. Shafer, 1986). Without doing so, the application of Bayesian methods would be "utterly 
ridiculous" as the problem structure would be ill-defined and the task intractable. The basic point is that 
whilst it is true that probability and decision theory can never solve problems of actual practice, they 
can in fact solve idealisations of those problems. And so the application of these approaches - whether 
intuitively or explicitly - is valuable to the extent that those idealisations are good ones (Jaynes, 2003; 
Savage, 1972). The question of what is a good or useful idealisation depends on the purpose of the 
exercise, and is inevitably judgment-laden, rather than answerable within the framework of decision 
theory itself. Of course there are other pragmatic constraints to the application of decision theoretic 
 approaches, e.g. where there is insufficient theoretical knowledge to support idealisation, or there is a 
lack of reliable data, or because decisions are simply urgent. In such situations, inexact, heuristic 
methods of problem-solving must be relied upon. But this is quite orthogonal to the distinction between 
small and large worlds. 
Intriguingly, whilst the authors of all three chapters adopt quite different methodological and 
theoretical commitments, their normative arguments show striking commonalities. They all advocate 
increasing the engagement of citizens in decision making on risk and innovation, whether in terms of 
upstream engagement (Macnaghten), or enhancing communicative competence and finding better ways 
of mediating between conflicting stakeholder interests (Renn), or improving decision support and 
problem-structuring methods (Arvai et al.). Yet this sits alongside the troubling recalcitrance of the 
“deficit model” within regulatory agencies and elite scientific institutions and advisory panels (Wynne, 
2006; Rayner, 2004; MacGillivray and Pidgeon, 2011). This model presupposes systematic disagreements 
between experts and laypeople on evaluations of risk issues, and attributes such gaps to deficits in 
factual knowledge or, more recently, deficits in reasoning capacities on the part of the public. This leads 
naturally to a concern that such “erroneous” risk perceptions may be replicated in law, policy, and 
regulation, as democratic governments respond to the (mis)fears of the citizenry (MacGillivray, 2014b). 
These concerns have catalyzed an influential school of thought, which prescribes a relatively 
technocratic approach to regulating risk, characterized by a high degree of deference to formal risk and 
cost-benefit analysis in the policy-making process (e.g. Sunstein, 2008; Breyer, 1993). This is intended to 
provide institutional safeguards that screen out the malign influence of heuristic-based, error-prone lay 
judgments, and so help ensure rational risk regulation. This school of thought—and its close cousin, the 
Nudge agenda (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008)—has intimately shaped policy debates and practices 
throughout the West. Nevertheless, the basic argument has been challenged on a variety of fronts. It 
has been critiqued as paternalistic or even undemocratic, in that it fails to respect citizen preferences, 
accused of downplaying the value-laden and approximate nature of formal risk and decision analysis, 
and, most relevant to the above discussion, portrayed as being rooted in an oversimplified and uncritical 
reading of the risk perception literature (Kahan et al., 2006; MacGillivray 2014b and references therein). 
It is no small irony that a subset of the findings from the decision sciences - mostly within behavioural 
economics, but also a somewhat skewed interpretation of the heuristics and biases tradition - has 
travelled so easily into institutional settings, despite longstanding questions surrounding their realism 
and generalisability. 
 
 Conclusions 
 We conclude by restating our arguments. Whilst the early environmental movements were 
closely tied to threats to particular places, the modern sustainability crisis is characterised by diffuse, 
global, and potentially catastrophic risks. This sits alongside a widespread public sense of apathy and 
fatalism, in relation to challenges ranging from climate change to deforestation to global food security, 
and a skepticism of the capacity of the regulatory state to foresee and manage the consequences of 
scientific and technological innovation. Whilst many risk management institutions have responded with 
official rhetoric emphasising the need to improve public participation and rebuild trust, their actual 
practices have often been rather reductive and exclusionary, focussed more on dampening controversy 
and educating an unruly public, rather than on meaningful, upstream engagement. In part this stems 
from a logic of risk governance that presupposes relatively restrictive norms of risk analysis (e.g. 
reinforcing a strict fact-value dichotomy), and in at least equal measure from the surprising recalcitrance 
of the “deficit model.” One consequence of this long-standing instinct to discipline public reason is that 
recent methodological advances in problem structuring tools and in the design of forums for upstream 
engagement have yet to be implemented at the scale one might like. Meanwhile, the rationality debate 
rumbles on, with decision scientists and evolutionary psychologists still warring over what norms should 
be used to evaluate decision-making under uncertainty, how the mind is structured, as well as 
disagreeing on more esoteric aspects of experimental design and analysis. They do seem to agree that 
decision-theoretic approaches are inapplicable to “large worlds;” we have argued that this is incorrect 
and is based on a misinterpretation of Savage. They also seem to share a relative neglect of higher order 
processes, that is, of the study of how people reason about risk, focussing instead on tasks of estimation 
and choice. Skinner would have been amused. In the midst of this, a highly selective and partial reading 
of the decision sciences has travelled rather easily into risk management institutions, allowing for the 
reconstruction of the seemingly invincible deficit model. And so the predominant logic of risk 
governance remains focussed on supplanting fallible lay judgments with rational calculations of risk and 
benefit, an ideal that is as old as Plato (Hacking, 2014) and that defined Enlightenment thought (Porter, 
2011). Plus ça change. 
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